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TIME: Almanac 1995
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TIME Almanac 1995.iso
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020794
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02079920.000
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1994-05-26
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<text id=94TT0151>
<title>
Feb. 07, 1994: The Perils of Good Intentions
</title>
<history>
TIME--The Weekly Newsmagazine--1994
Feb. 07, 1994 Lock 'Em Up And Throw Away The Key
</history>
<article>
<source>Time Magazine</source>
<hdr>
DIPLOMACY, Page 44
The Perils of Good Intentions
</hdr>
<body>
<p>Humanitarian aid is proving no substitute for action in post-cold
war conflicts
</p>
<p>By Marguerite Michaels--With reporting by James L. Graff/Zagreb and Andrew Purvis/Mogadishu
</p>
<p> Hunger and hopelessness can drive people to desperate acts.
As a 10-truck U.N. aid convoy entered the Muslim village of
Ticici in central Bosnia on its way to Tuzla last Wednesday,
more than 200 residents stood waiting by the road. Someone opened
fire from the window of a house at the convoy's police escort,
and the villagers mobbed the trucks, grabbing for any supplies
they could reach. It was the second attack in two days on a
convoy in Ticici, where villagers believe they are not receiving
their fair share of food.
</p>
<p> On Thursday night, gunmen armed with assault weapons ambushed
a Land Rover belonging to three British aid workers near a food
warehouse in the central Bosnian city of Zenica. The bandits
took all three to an isolated spot, where they executed the
driver and wounded the other two as they fled. The Overseas
Development Administration, which manages British humanitarian
aid to Bosnia and carries 40% of U.N.-distributed supplies,
suspended its deliveries.
</p>
<p> Months of strict Serbian and Croatian blockades have reduced
the Muslims in supply-starved central Bosnia to banditry and
the looting of food meant for the thousands of other Muslim
refugees in besieged Tuzla, 45 miles to the north. Increased
harassment at checkpoints has cut aid to the Muslims to a fraction
of what Serbs and Croats receive.
</p>
<p> Humanitarian aid is, in the post-cold war world, increasingly
the response of choice to the plethora of small-scale slaughters
that prick the West's collective conscience but do not seem
important enough to command greater diplomatic or military involvement.
The travails in delivery last week were only a symptom of the
lack of political will in Western capitals to act forcefully.
Humanitarian aid feels good to those who insist that something
must be done to stop the killing in Bosnia, in Somalia, in a
dozen other bloody conflicts. And it is far more politically
palatable than sending soldiers to fight and die in countries--without strategic assets like oil or nuclear weapons--that
few people can locate on a map. But as Bosnia and Somalia show,
aid by itself solves very little and rapidly becomes part of
the problem.
</p>
<p> Never have so many aid workers paid such a high price for their
commitment. Eleven U.N. relief staff members have died in Bosnia.
Kidnappings, shootings and death threats are part of the job
description in Somalia, where six aid workers have been slain.
Although the Clinton Administration denies it, there is a perception
that the U.S. has chosen to abandon Somalia rather than contend
with the dangers. Turkish General Cevik Bir, leaving the command
of the U.N. operation there last week, leaked an "eyes only"
letter to U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, indirectly
chastising the Americans and Europeans for "mission erosion."
Said Bir: "The contributing nations must be committed enough
to accept the violence and loss of life associated with war,
and then stay the course."
</p>
<p> The U.N. forces assigned to safeguard the convoys complain bitterly
over the gap between their task of assuring free passage through
a raging factional war zone and the means provided to achieve
it. With only 13,000 troops on the ground and no air cover,
"our job is becoming impossible," said Belgian General Francis
Briquemont just after he asked to leave his post as commander
of Bosnia six months early. The overall chief of the U.N. forces,
French General Jean Cot, has been relieved of his job after
quarreling publicly with Boutros-Ghali over his right to call
in air strikes when troops are attacked.
</p>
<p> Even the policy of humanitarian aid has come under fire. Frustrated
that the Americans are using aid contributions as an excuse
to avoid sending in ground forces, French Foreign Minister Alain
Juppe urged the U.S. last week to take a more active role to
push the Muslim-dominated government into accepting a settlement
partitioning Bosnia among the three ethnic blocs. "The humanitarian
track," he said, "is not enough. "
</p>
<p> Originally volunteers followed armies onto the battlefield to
care for victims. Now it is the armies themselves that must
accompany humanitarian organizations to the front line if aid
is to be distributed. As the angels of mercy in Bosnia have
learned, it is all too easy for combatants to stop, steal or
hold hostage the shipments, thrusting the troops protecting
them into the middle of the war. Air strikes--something the
U.S. and its allies have resisted--may now be necessary to
relieve Canadian troops in the Bosnian town of Srebrenica, a
U.N.-declared "safe" enclave surrounded by Serbs. In Mogadishu
12,000 U.N. soldiers are sitting inside walled compounds rather
than risk casualties by patrolling the streets. "They are doing
nothing but eating and sleeping," says a U.N. military adviser.
"Ridiculous."
</p>
<p> As aid increasingly serves as a geopolitical tool, the proud
humanitarian tradition of neutrality has largely been shattered.
"There is a definite change in the attitude toward humanitarian
workers," says U.N. aid official Paul Mitchell. "We are now
targets." Aid staff members, alone and together with their uniformed
escorts, have taken sides, wittingly and unwittingly, in these
fragmented, fratricidal wars. In Somalia, "relief workers tend
to become identified with different subclans," says Lance Salisbury,
assistant country representative for Catholic Relief Services.
"And the leaders attempt to draw you into larger conflicts."
In Baidoa, where Salisbury is based, most of his staff is from
the Lyssan subclan, which prompted attacks from an opposing
subclan.
</p>
<p> Nearly two years and more than 200,000 deaths after the West
began to assist the Bosnians, some are asking if the aid intended
to save lives has only prolonged the war. "That is a downright
deadly argument," retorts Wolfgang Berger of the Austrian Catholic
charity Caritas, the largest private agency working in the former
Yugoslavia. "You can't make peace by sacrificing still more
civilians to hunger and destitution."
</p>
<p> But Mark Almond, a fellow of the London-based Institute for
European Defense and Strategic Studies, believes humanitarian
aid in Bosnia has done more harm than good: Serbs and Croats
at checkpoints have exacted tolls in hard currency, siphoned
food and medicine from the relief trucks and then used the cash
and supplies to sustain the fighting. Roads improved by the
U.N. to facilitate access for aid convoys have made it easier
for all three factions to move troops and guns. The 300,000
survivors of the two-year-long siege of Sarajevo refer to themselves
bitterly as "the well-fed dead," plied with just enough food
to keep them alive for more shelling and sniper fire while Western
nations refuse them military help to end the siege.
</p>
<p> The West is also discovering that once a nation engages to bring
war-torn countries relief, it is almost impossible to disengage.
Last week Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd visited the British
troops in Bosnia to see if it might be a smart time to get them
out. He came home full of admiration for the soldiers fighting
to deliver aid despite constant danger. Britain's participation
in the humanitarian program--as frustrating as it is--is
popular enough that one Foreign Office official admitted "withdrawal
would be difficult domestically."
</p>
<p> From the beginning it was widely understood that humanitarian
aid was not going to resolve a war of such ethnic-based savagery
as Bosnia's. But aid was deemed sufficient to straighten out
Somalia, where the fighting was considered to be the result
of hardship. Yet as both cases demonstrate, in the continued
absence of concerted political and military initiatives for
peace, humanitarian-aid workers are losing the war against misery.
The West will pay a high price for that defeat in a loss of
credibility, loss of capacity for effective action, loss of
the right to call itself civilized.
</p>
</body>
</article>
</text>